Tokenized RWAs OFT Threat Model
Shared Threat Model
The following threats and mitigations are shared with Stablecoin OFT:- Pauser / Unpauser key compromise — Same split-role mitigation. See Stablecoin OFT Security.
- Fee deposit address compromise — Same push-based model. Attacker controlling
feeDepositcan only receive fees, not extract principal. - Supply inflation via misconfigured deployment — Ensure each
NexusERC20grantsMINTER_ROLE/BURNER_ROLEonly to the intended burner-minter address. - Fund recovery abuse — Same
recoverFundsrestriction: only from non-allowlisted addresses. - Non-atomic proxy deployment — Same risk. Deploy proxy and call
initializeatomically.
Compliance Controls
Allowlist (via NexusERC20Guard)
The shared guard enforces allowlist checks ontransfer, transferFrom, and burn for all registered NexusERC20 tokens. Mode switches (Open → Blacklist → Whitelist) are instant and do not clear existing lists.
Per-Token Pause (via NexusERC20Guard)
EachNexusERC20 can be paused independently using uint160(tokenAddress) as the pause ID. This allows freezing a specific token’s local transfers without affecting other tokens.
Per-Pathway Pause (via NexusPauseModule)
Cross-chain sends can be paused at four levels: globally, per destination, per token, or per (token, destination) pair. Priority resolution determines the effective state.Fund Recovery
Same mechanism as Stablecoin OFT — admin can transfer tokens from non-allowlisted addresses for compliance seizures.Monitoring
Events to monitor across the Tokenized RWAs OFT deployment:Next Steps
- RBAC Reference for the complete role-to-function matrix
- Architecture for the system design overview